March 31, 2016

More on China's Future SeaWeb

If the pink submarine is a 4,500 tonne Future Australian submarine moving within 50km of the Chinese coast - things may not end well. Chinese undersea SeaWeb sensors may alert (lightweight torpedo carrying) ballistic or cruise missile batteries that a potential target sub is within range. Chinese smart and mobile seafloor mines, sown among the sensors, are another threat. The diagram is  on page 16 of American ex-submariner, Bryan Clark’s important paper The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare, January 22, 2015.
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The Chinese have proven themselves very patient and methodical island builders in the South China Sea. Why wouldn't they methodically sow a large pattern of undersea SeaWeb sensors out to 50 km off their coast in the South China Sea. Such sensor network construction can also compensate for the suspected lower quality of Chinese submarines

SeaWebs are mainly undersea sensors, databases and anti-submarine weapon cueing networks.

As the USNS Impeccable found in 2009 the Chinese resent intelligence gathering near their shores. Impeccable was also suspected of sowing US undersea SeaWeb sensors on the approaches to China's nuclear submarine base at Yulin/Sanya on Hainan Island. 





The ocean-island geographies of the South and East China Seas are tailor-made for the growing development of China’s SeaWeb networks. Such networks may include lines of sensors from Chinese island air/naval bases (eg, Subi, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs). See map above

Soon Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) only 140 miles (220 km) from Manila Philippines, may be added to the list of new Chinese island air/naval bases. A SeaWeb sensor line may also be strung between Scarborough and the large Chinese base island of Hainan (see red dashed line on the map below).



Harry Kazianis, writing in the Asia Times, has produced a very interesting body of articles on the China threat to Western interests in East Asia. His article “Coming soon to the South China Sea: Beijing’s best weapons of war”, March 25, 2016, in part, deals with China’s SeaWeb development:

"Sonar nets: While not an outright kinetic-style weapon, stringing together a sophisticated sonar network that could seekout US submarines – the very heart of America’s efforts to negate China’s A2/AD strategy — could provide a decisive advantage.

While there is little in English-based open source documents, Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight have uncovered various Chinese language open source materials that show Beijing is working on — as of at least 2014 — sonar net test sites in the East, South and Yellow Seas. It stands to reason that China has continued to work on and enhance such efforts. If Beijing were able to perfect such technology and deploy such a capability in such a manner where a new sonar net was set up in around China’s new islands in the South China Sea, such a system might make Washington very wary of deploying advanced nuclear-powered subs there in a crisis. As I explained back in 2014:

“If Beijing were to perfect such technology it could largely negate the military capabilities of America’s submarine forces, which in many respects are the foundation of the budding Air-Sea Battle operational concept [and very likely its successor, JAM-GC]. If China were able to field such a network … American subs could be pushed back beyond the range of such networks. This would impact the ability of American forces in a conflict to deliver kinetic strikes on the Chinese coast [and as well as China’s new South China Sea islands] by way of Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAMs). Considering the investment Washington is making in new versions of nuclear attack submarines, specifically a new version of the Virginia Class that includes a new payload module to carry more TLAMs, Washington would be wise to consider how to respond to Beijing’s latest move.” [see WHOLE ARTICLE BY HARRY KAZIANIS]


COMMENT

Large Australian, US or Japanese UUVs could perform and intelligence gathering tasks required near the Chinese coast. Such UUVs could be submarine, ship launched, air-dropped. They could also be  launched from friendly coasts or islands in the region. Being much smaller than subs UUVs are harder to detect. And no crews to lose.

Pete

March 27, 2016

The future French SSN and SSBN Programs - DCNS Prototype for Australian CEP

DCNS HULL PROTOTYPE (BARRACUDA) FOR SHORTFIN CONTENDER, 2007 - 2017 LAUNCHES, 1 EXPECTED

Barracuda SSN Name
Laid down
Launch (est.)
Commissioning (est.)
Suffren
19 Dec 2007
end of 2016 (the crew expect)
end 2018 
Duguay-Trouin
26 June 2009
?
end 2020
Tourville
28 June 2011
?
2022
Grasse 
?
?
2025
Ruby
?
?
2027
Casabianca
?
?
2029
DCNS indicate that the "Shortfin" contender for Future Australian Submarine is to be a conventional (diesel-electric) version of the nuclear propelled Barracuda SSN (Suffren class). Barracudas laid down 2007 - first may be launched in 2017. Table based on https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classe_Suffren_(sous-marin)#Noms . 
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The Shortfin that France is offering is to be a conventional version of the future Barracuda SSN. The first Barracuda, the Suffren, was laid down in 2007 and apparently will be launched late 2017 (see Suffren's future crew article) and commissioned late 2018.

What occurred in the decade (so far) of Barracuda/Suffren's construction has not been explained to the Australian public or appeared in the media. Apparently the French Government delayed the construction schedule due to:

-  changing mission requirements involving redesign (changes to submarine) perhaps in view of the growing threat from Russia and greater intelligence gathering needs in the post 9/11 War on Terror

-  to reduce annual Barracuda construction spending in order to cross subsidize other defence programs and civilian budget items (following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis?)


"The fall of the USSR and the new world order, with its low intensity conflicts and the increase in maritime traffic, have upgraded the role of navies. The evolution of the missions has significantly delayed the replacement schedule of the six SSNs of the [current] Ruby [Rubis] class ...by six attack submarines [the Barracuda SSNs]. The Barracuda definition phase started in October 1998 and design phase in 2002 for the then planned [launch and] tests in 2008 and [entry into] service in 2010. In 2015, the commissioning of the first in class [Suffren] was postponed [to] 2018 as a result of budget difficulties."

The French Government then reasoned the 8 year delay offered the advantage of being able to smooth (budget and labour force) transition from the last Barracuda (launch around 2028) to the development of the SSBN class replacing the current Triomphant SSBNs. Replacement SSBN class design work will accelerate from the late 2020s with perhaps the replacement SSBN first of class being laid down around 2037.

These need to redesign, re-budget and program transition reasons for the delay in launching the Barracudas have made sense to the French Government that ultimately owns DCNS but it still involves much non-scheduled uncertainty - something ASC is already too good at. The private competitors to DCNS in Australia's Future Submarine contest (that is TKMS, MHI and KHI) would find it unprofitable to have the first 3 submarines of a class (see Table above) sitting in huge sheds  under construction for 10 years (on average) before those 3 submarines are actually launched.

The Australian war-ship-building industry can benefit from greater certainty and discipline in what is Australia's most expensive defence project ever.

The Japanese Soryu's building record [Table below] with the prototype for the Australian Soryu [if Japan is chosen] shows certainty not only down to yearly milestones, but frequently down to the month. Very methodical, on-time, on-budget.

JAPANESE (MHI/KHI BUILT) HULL PROTOTYPE FOR AUS SORYU CONTENDER (2007-2017 LAUNCHES,  8 LAUNCHED + 2 (EXPECTED)
SS
No.
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi-ssioned
Built
By
16SS Soryu
Mark 1
8116
Sōryū
SS-501
¥60B FY2004
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
No
21SS
No 21SS built
22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
Mar 2013
Nov 2015
Mar 2017
KHI
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
Oct 2013
Nov 2016?
Mar 2018
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
LABs + AIP
Oct 2014
Nov 2017?
Mar 2019
KHI
Table courtesy of information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries,  AIP = air independent propulsion.   
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Pete

March 21, 2016

Offshore Patrol Vessel (SEA 1180) CEP occuring right now

A model of ST Marine's Fearless 75 design on display at Pacific 2015 in Sydney. ST Marine has already built smaller Fearless 55's for the Singaporean Navy. (Model photo and caption courtesy IHS Jane’s 360 /Ridzwan Rahmat)
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River class OPV. Several in service with UK RN, one with Royal Thai Navy (Artwork courtesy IHS Jane's 360
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A Venezuelan Navy Coast Guard Guaicamacuto class patrol boat which is based on Navantia's Avante 1400 design. Avante variants are also serving in the Spanish Navy (Armada) (Photo courtesy Navantia via IHS Jane's 360
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While Submarine Matters has been focussing on the, at times, vitriolic Future Submarine CEP debate other Australian non-sub acquisition processes are intrain.

This includes the current SEA 1180 Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) Competitive Evaluation Process. 
The OPV CEP has the more specific name “Analysis of OPV Alternatives” and is seeking to assess existing off the shelf vessels with minimum changes. 

Compiling a shortlist of (ideally) three or more was outsourced (?) to UK based BMT Defence Services in September 2015, BTW here is a BMT PDF Paper which seems to be on the OPV. The short list, with indicative costs, is due mid-2016. Australia's Defence Department is due to present a recommendation to Prime Minister Turnbull (if he’s there after the 2016 Election) and then to the  broader National Security Committee of Cabinet to make decisions.

The construction of OPVs has been brought forward by two years, with a continuous onshore build projected to commence in 2018 [see 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) paragraph 4.118].

Twelve OPVs are being built to progressively replace Armidale Class Patrol Boats (which are rapidly wearing out in part due to searching for refugee vessels). See 2016 DWP paragraph 4.117.

The new OPVs will be:

-  much larger and more capable ships than the 300 ton Armidales
-  will have a helicopter
-  probably will be UAV, UUV and surface SUV capable
-  have a longer range and endurance than the Armidales
-  no SEA 1180 OPV capability requirements have been publicly released(?) but it could be a vessel of around 80m and 1,500 tonnes
-  large enough to accommodate a reasonably sized gun (30 - 56mm?)
-  and to safely operate the helicopter.

SEA 1180 is now squarely about patrol boat replacement with much less emphasis on multi-mission (eg, survey vessel) replacement. Mine-hunting maybe a future modular capability.

The new OPVs will be a substantial purchase - see the 2016 Defence Integrated Investment Program (DIIP), page 89, Table 6, which contains the following mentions:

-  “Offshore Patrol Vessel – Evaluation, Scheduled for approval,  Less than $100 million”, then 
-  “Offshore Patrol Vessel – Design and Construction, 2016-2033, $3 billion - $4 billion”.

POSSIBLE CONTENDERS

 include:

-  BAE River class OPV with one already constructed in Thailand for the Royal Thai Navy.  Several already built in UK for UK Royal Navy. (various sizes, eg. "Clyde" is 81.5m and 1,850 tonnes)
-  Navantia’s Avante 1400 (80m, 1,500 tonnes full load)
-  ST Marine’s Fearless 75 (75m, 1,100 tons)

DCNS, Fincantieri and Damen may also be possibles for the shortlist of three or more.

COMMENT

The OPVs may be assembled in many shipyards around Australia but I’d say probably in Perth, WA and/or Williamstown, VIC.

SOURCES

Mile Yeo writing in the Asia Pacific Defence Reporter (APDR), March 2016, "WHITE PAPER GIVES THE GO-AHEAD", pages 23-25, (subscription) http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/



Pete

March 20, 2016

Risks in Japanese submarine partnership and Latest Soryu Table

There's a good article, of March 16, 2016, on the Australian Naval Institute website. This is by Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU. This article at http://navalinstitute.com.au/risks-in-japanese-submarine-partnership/ first appeared in The Age newspaper.  

"Risks in Japanese submarine partnership"

The article ends:

"What kind of co-operation will we get from Japan if in say, five or 10 years, with the project well under way but no subs yet delivered, Japan faces a confrontation with China and we don’t give it the support it expects? Why wouldn’t Japan walk away from the project, or start putting tight limits on what [sensitive submarine technology] it is willing to share with us?

That would be a disaster for the submarine project, and for our relations with Japan. So we’d be much better off keeping them separate. The beauty of the German and French bids is that their bids are so much simpler. They are only in it for the money, and that’s a good thing, because that is a price we know we are willing to pay."

[see the whole article on the Australian Naval Institute website]

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MHI and KHI are very methodical, building submarines for Japan, on-time, on-budget, for decades (since the 1960s). 

See the possible submarine building schedule for Australian Future Submarine in red below
 (Aus1, Aus2 - 12)


SORYU TABLE (with earlier Oyashios, as at March 22, 2016)

SS
No.
Build No
Name
Pennant
No.
MoF approved amount ¥ Billions & FY
LABs, LIBs, AIP
Laid Down
Laun
-ched
Commi-ssioned
Built
By
5SS
8105
Oyashio
SS-590/ TS3608
¥52.2B
FY1993
LABs only
 Jan 1994
Oct 1996
Mar 1998
 KHI
6SS-15SS
Oyashios
10 subs
8106
-8115
various
SS-591-600
¥52.2B per sub
FY1994-FY2003
LABs only
 Feb 1994
Mar 2008
 MHI
&
KHI
16SS Soryu
Mark 1
8116
Sōryū
SS-501
¥60B FY2004
LABs + AIP
Mar 2005
Dec 2007
Mar
2009
MHI
17SS
8117
Unryū
SS-502
¥58.7B FY2005
LABs + AIP
Mar 2006
Oct 2008
Mar
2010
KHI
18SS
8118
Hakuryū
SS-503
¥56.2 FY2006
LABs + AIP
Feb 2007
Oct 2009
Mar
2011
MHI
19SS
8119
Kenryū
SS-504
¥53B FY2007
LABs + AIP
Mar 2008
Nov 2010
Mar
2012
KHI
20SS
8120
Zuiryū
SS-505
¥51B FY2008
LABs + AIP
Mar 2009
Oct 2011
Mar
2013
MHI
No
21SS
No 21SS built
22SS
8121
Kokuryū
SS-506
¥52.8B FY2010
LABs + AIP
Jan 2011
Oct 2013
Mar
2015
KHI
23SS
8122
Jinryu
SS-507
¥54.6B FY2011
LABs + AIP
Feb 2012
Oct 2014
7 Mar 2016
MHI
24SS
8123
Sekiryū
SS-508
¥54.7B FY2012
LABs + AIP
Mar 2013
Nov 2015
Mar 2017
KHI
25SS
8124
SS-509
¥53.1B FY2013
LABs + AIP
Oct 2013
Nov 2016
Mar 2018
MHI
26SS
8125
SS-510
¥51.7B FY2014
LABs + AIP
?
?
Mar 2019
KHI
27SS
Soryu
Mark 2
8126
SS-511
¥64.3B FY2015
LIBs only
?
?
Mar 2020
MHI
28SS
8127
SS-512
¥63.6B FY2016
LIBs only
?
?
Mar 2021
KHI
29SS
?
?
 1st of New
Japanese  Class
LIBs only
?
?
2023?
MHI?
Aus1
?
?
1st of new Aus class (if Japan chosen)
LIBs only
2028?
2030?
2033?
in Aus or Jpn?
Aus2 to 12?
?
?
between 5 and 11 additional Aus subs
LIBs only
from 2029?
from 2031?
from 2034?
in Aus or Jpn?
Table courtesy of information provided to Submarine Matters. LABs = lead-acid batteries,  
AIP = air independent propulsion, LIBs = lithium-ion batteries.  


Pete