March 19, 2024

Australian Liberal’s Nuclear Policy Lacks Weapons

In Australia the myth of quick, easy, uncomplicated building anywhere of "economical" small modular reactor (SMR) projects just won't die out. 

Large conventional reactors of over 3 GW, as in France, make more sense in Australia. This is from a zero base of no power reactors in Australia at present. This will lead to decades-long legal, planning and political battles for each and every reactor project and nuclear waste dump in Australia. This will be followed by 2 decades of construction and high security protection costs for reactors and waste dumps. 

The minority Australian Liberal Party's nuclear electricity lobby, that makes  outlandish claims, please take note of the following:

71 years ago the Father of the US Nuclear (propulsion) Navy and Father of the US electricity reactor in the US Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Rickover, pointed out the nuclear ignorance of the likes of our Liberal Party.

"Admiral Rickover's 'Paper Reactor' Memo" written on June 5, 1953 at http://whatisnuclear.com/rickover.html is as accurate now as it was then. Rickover drew a distinction between:

A. academic "paper reactor" policy proponents "The academic-reactor designer is a dilettante. He has not had to assume any real responsibility in connection with his projects." and

B. those who actually build reactors. Noting "Rickover oversaw the development of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station, the [world's] first commercial pressurized water reactor nuclear power [ie. electricity] plant."  

Wrote Rickover in 1953:

A. "An academic reactor...almost always has the following basic characteristics:

1. It is simple.

2. It is small.

3. It is cheap.

4. It is light.

5. It can be built very quickly.

6. It is very flexible in purpose (“omnibus reactor”)

7. Very little development is required. It will use mostly “off-the-shelf” components.

8. The reactor is in the study phase. It is not being built now."

[eg. there is still no built SMR for sale on the market.]
 

B. "On the other hand, a practical reactor plant can be distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. It is being built now.

2. It is behind schedule.

3. It is requiring an immense amount of development on apparently trivial items. Corrosion, in particular, is a problem.

4. It is very expensive.

5. It takes a long time to build because of the engineering development problems.

6. It is large.

7. It is heavy.

8. It is complicated."

Does all that sound familiar?

The biggest political question is what majority of Australian voters in a town, city, state or Electorate would welcome a reactor in their "backyard"? Given that concern it is best to build a reactor on defence land, ie. long owned by the Federal Government, not somewhere pretty or with a long Aboriginal heritage (that will not be questioned).

The overarching reality is, unless a national nuclear industry has dual-use civilian and nuclear weapons qualities (a reality the P5 early sprinters, eg. the US, UK and France, exploited for THEMSELVES) Australia won't accept reactors politically, economically or strategically.

Orka-class Specifications Table: Dutch: Naval Group

After internet searching no current, precise, detailed, list of Naval Group (NG) specifications (specs) for the Orkas have been located. Instead I've drawn together (and sometimes inferred) specs from a variety of internet sources (see some links in the Table below). 

NG has limited the publication of the Orkas' projected specs as keeping the specs secret for as long as politically possible is standard in the submarine industry for National Security and Commercial-in-Confidence reasons. Detailed specs would reflect some of the Netherlands’s more secret needs. NG and the Netherlands will gradually release more spec details.

Now NG has won the Walrus replacement competition on the basis of the March 15, 2024 decision of the Dutch Council of Ministers. But the lower House of the Dutch Parliament, from debate beginning March 18, 2024, still needs to approve this decision. Best description of political situation is from the Netherland's Jaime Karremann the founder of Marineschips.nl.

Specs for preceding Walrus-class and Barracuda-class variants help. Also see Wikipedia's Orka website.


ORKA SPECIFICATIONS TABLE

Figures as at March 19, 2024
Class overview
Name:
Naval Group Orka-class for the Netherlands. "Variant chain" is Barracuda to Shortfin to Blacksword to Orka-class.
Operator:
Envisaged only for the Royal Netherlands Navy so far.
4 planned
Netherlands requires 2 commissioned (Orka and Zvaardvis) by 2034–2035. Then the 2 others (Barracuda and Tijgerhaai) before 2040.
To be built at NG's Cherbourg shipyard in France?
Preceded by:
Walrus class . 
Likely to be 100 HLES high-yield pressure hull steel, see US HY-100 and HY-130 . Also  see Submarine Matters article Table that uses a Japanese document.
Officers and Crew
Between 35 and 43 standard + 16 extra bunks for divers/special forces or intelligence intercept/linguist officers (depending on mission)
Speed/range
and
Endurance
14 knots (surfaced), 22 knots (submerged). 15,000 nm. All improvements over Walrus specs
Endurance est 70 days depending on fuel, food & crew exhaustion.
Typical mission profiles may be:
Transit + Ops Netherlands to Dutch Caribbean and return.
Transit + Ops Netherlands to Arabian Sea and return.
North Sea and Arctic Ocean against Russia.
Displacement:
3,300 tonnes (surfaced) so 3,700 tonnes (submerged) is estimated
Length
82 m  See Artwork with Specs below.
Diameter (Beam)
8.2 m  Artwork with Specs below.
Height
? meters (hull + fin/sail)
Pumpjet, Propeller
Acoustic stealth
Rubber/elastic mountings for moving and reverberating parts inside. Noise cancelers.
Capable of projecting
Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
Underwater decoys (against torpedoes and mobile mines)
On hull behind fin/sail.
Dry dock shelter for divers, diver delivery vehicles and large displacement UUVs (XLUUVs)
Weapons
6 × 533 mm (21.0 in) torpedo tubes. 30 heavyweight (HW) weapons. Maybe Walrus weapons will be transferred ie Mk 48 HWTs, Harpoon SSMs, even Tomahawk land attack SLCMs and Stonefish mines. Or maybe French weapons. This is a big area of uncertain debate?

Sensors
Mainly French NG-Thales UMS-3000 ? 
Combat System
A mixed US and French Combat System likely. Using a TTCWS interface. US Lockheed Martin and mainly French NG-Thales likely main intergrators. Combat system being the network of sensors, databases, consoles, optronic masts and weapons costing about one third of the upfront price of a submarine.
Max Depth
300+ meters
Exterior stealth
Propulsion:
 4 x MTU 16V 396 SE or 4 x MTU 12V 4000 diesels. Likely no AIP.
Jeumont Electric Motors (Jeumont now subsidiary of NG-Framatome). with 
4.5 to 5MW of power.
 Saft Lithium-ion batteries also see on the LIBs.
---


Artwork with Specs courtesy Naval Group (March 16, 2024) via (Mr) Jaime Karremann's website 
https://marineschepen.nl/nieuws/Wat-we-nu-weten-over-de-nieuwe-Nederlandse-onderzeeboten-160324.html

March 18, 2024

Delayed Orkas? TKMS, Naval Group & Saab: Iranian "AIP"!

Shawn C, on Thursday March 14, 2024 (just before the Dutch Orka decision) commented offline:

TKMS MATTERS

https://youtu.be/hI5md1HOBT4?si=F0Qdw2SlPtG5RFrY

Note: TKMS just built a new sub building facility in Kiel. This will allow TKMS to simultaneously produce:

  • 2-3 submarines a year - not sure if he meant "build more subs"
  • Allows for the production of bigger boats – Type 212CD and 'bespoke customer requirements' (Which I thought was a hint at Israel's future Dakar class)
  • Planted questions about TKMS employment and supply to TKMS sales director.
  • Elaborated on 'orphan designs' - maybe based on Dolphin class experience? 
  • Production increase - can ramp up - speaks about Dutch production partner.
  • New TKMS hall improves production by 20% - to new submarine projects a year? RSS Invincible took 5 years to build (ordered 2013, construction began 2014, launched in 2019)
  • Uses Microsoft HoloLens for AR enhancement to production. https://www.microsoft.com/en-au/hololens 

Further on TKMS Production capacity:

NAVAL GROUP MATTERS

[Pete comment: Given the Netherlands has not finally chosen Naval Group’s (NG) Orka until the Dutch Parliament agrees...] Note: Between the three sub builders TKMS, NG and Saab. As a rough estimate, all three main shipbuilders (I have not assessed their Dutch partners) should have available construction facilities in 2027 for this program. 

All three are in active production of SSKs but NG is in India and Brazil.
[Pete comment: DCNS/NG last built Scorpenes in Cherboug up to 2009 along with 2 SSNs (in 2009) but not simultaneously with SSBNs. So Cherbourg production facilities (already for the remaining SSNs and future SSBNs) 
might be inadequate if Orkas also need to be built at Cherbourg? This might cause unexpected delays in the Orka Project. Will the Orkas need to be built elsewhere in France or in the Netherlands?] 
I do not think NG will want to divert French SNLE 3G/SSBN production
.

Suffren-class - the last in class NG Casabianca estimated 2029 delivery - 3 boats are concurrently in production, with the next two expected in 2025 and 2027. With the Rubis-class Saphir-Perle also returned to service in 2023, this may mean that NG has clear yard space (and clear Barracuda production facilities), though the SNLE 3G SSBN production was supposed to start at the end of 2023. [apparently the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SNLE_3G has not even been laid down yet!]

SAAB MATTERS

[Pete comment: As Saab has no foreign orders Saab’s loss of the Orka-class competition is a bitter blow. Saab may become involved in Australia's Collins Life of Type Extension (LOTE) from 2026 but that is not certain.]

Saab: 2 x A26 Blekinge-class are in production, with expected delivery in 2027 & 2028, last Gotland refit should be completed. [Maybe 2 more Blekinges will be ordered in the 2030s?].

SINGAPORE NAVY MATTERS

Wow! This is fast! 30 min before I saw this I was at the Singapore Ministry of Defense (Mindef) site checking press releases! 

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/03/singapore-cuts-steel-on-its-first-multirole-combat-vessel-mrcv/

Not out yet on Singapore news sites.

8,000 ton Multi Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) frigate with a 4 year delivery date... very ambitious.
 

“HOT” IRANIAN AIP OFFER

Does anyone want to buy Iranian AIP [on a 600 tonne Fateh-class submarine] ?

https://www.navalnews.com/event-news/dimdex-2024/2024/03/iran-unveils-aip-version-of-fateh-class-submarine-at-dimdex-2024/

March 15, 2024

Final Dutch Decision Awaits Lower House 18/3 Onwards

The final Dutch decision stage on the Walrus Replacement apparently will not be the Dutch Council of Ministers meeting on Friday March 15, 2024 (Dutch time). 

Instead the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament must debate the Decision on, or from, Monday, March 18 (Dutch time). 

Sources

1.  https://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/03/netherlands-to-order-four-new-submarines-from-french-shipbuilder/ 

"The order is politically sensitive because Saab, one of the losing bidders, has a partnership with Dutch shipyard Damen. Parliament is due to debate the [Walrus Replacement] deal next Monday, once the council of ministers has signed it off on Friday." 

and 

2.  https://nltimes.nl/2024/03/12/dutch-government-ordered-four-submarines-french-state-company-naval-eu6-bil-deal 

"The formal decision will be made at the weekly Cabinet [more correctly Council of Ministers] meeting on Friday, the sources said. After that, the Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the Dutch parliament, must assess and approve the purchase."

Pete Comment

I am unaware whether this subsequent lower house approval is a mere technicality or whether it is a major hurdle that might overturn the Council of Ministers' decision.

Also, might lower house approval potentially take hours, days or weeks?

March 14, 2024

Australia's Virginia Chances Dive Deeper

An excellent article by Dominic Giannini at AAP-MSN of March 13, 2024 at https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/australia/australia-faces-subs-challenge-in-us-nuclear-at-home/ar-BB1jMyE1 in part includes:

“Cuts to the production of a nuclear-powered submarine in the US have raised concerns about Australia's planned acquisition as the government moves ahead to regulate its nuclear industry in preparation.

A Virginia-class submarine has been cut from the 2025 proposed US defence budget.

…Australia was completely dependent on Washington to acquire the submarine and America would always back their navy if there was a shortage in production, former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull said.

"The reality is the Americans are not going to make their submarine deficit worse than it is already by giving or selling submarines to Australia and [Congress'] AUKUS legislation actually sets that up," he told ABC radio on Wednesday…”

"...Virginia-class submarines supposed to be delivered this year in America were running an average of more than 30 months late, US defence under secretary comptroller and chief financial officer Michael McCord said.

Money not flowing through to the industrial base fast enough was also a problem, Mr McCord said, as he pointed to there being more than a dozen on order that remained in production."

[Australia's Part-time Defence Minister Marles should take note what the US DoD is saying] 

"Spending money to prop up industry rather than spending it on another submarine was a smarter investment, [McCord] added..."

More see https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/australia/australia-faces-subs-challenge-in-us-nuclear-at-home/ar-BB1jMyE1

Pete Comment

The most valid measure of Virginia production is “Commissioned” see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia-class_submarine#Boats_in_class With current yearly commissionings averaging 1.3 Virginias per year. 

Using "Boats in class" commissionings were:

- 2 in 2022

- 1 in 2023, and

-  1 is due in 2024 "Scheduled for 6 April" 

Hence cutting 1.0 per year might mean no Virginias being commissioned in 2025 and/or 2026.

This truly worries the USN. Hence it is, no doubt, advising the Secretary of Defense, Congress and the President that all existing and new Virginias should be retained by the USN - through to the early 2040s at least.

March 13, 2024

Further Reports France Won Walrus Replacement

On Wednesday 13, 2024 Anonymous commented

“It looks increasingly likely that Naval has indeed won this contract. Multiple Dutch news services announced it overnight Australian time.

https://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/03/netherlands-to-order-four-new-submarines-from-french-shipbuilder/

The official announcement is stated to occur this Friday [March 15, which will be Saturday, March 16 in Australia, but evidently losing tenderers are informally notified in advance.”

ARTICLE

That excellent Dutch News article of March 12, 2024 reports: lhttps://www.dutchnews.nl/2024/03/netherlands-to-order-four-new-submarines-from-french-shipbuilder/

“Netherlands to order four new submarines from French shipbuilder”

The Dutch government is expected to announce an order this week for four submarines from French shipbuilder Naval Group, sources have told RTL News. 

[Naval Group] The Paris-based company, which is 62.5% owned by the French state, saw off competition from Swedish firm Saab and Germany’s TKMS to build the vessels at a total cost of around €4 billion.

They will replace the Walrus-class submarines which have been in service since 1990. As much as 40% of the work will be carried out in the Netherlands, RTL reported

The order is politically sensitive because Saab, one of the losing bidders, has a partnership with Dutch shipyard Damen. Parliament is due to debate the deal next Monday, once the council of ministers has signed it off on Friday.

Two weeks ago the cabinet ordered four new frigates from Damen under a contract worth at least €2.5 billion. Arming the vessels will cost another €2.5 billion, making it the biggest maritime order ever placed with a Dutch manufacturer.

PETE COMMENT

Anonymous on March 11, 2024 provided estimated specs of the possible winning French submarine: “…it was mentioned that the French submarine for The Netherlands submarine replacement will have a displacement of 3,000 tonnes [surfaced?], a length of 80 meters and a smaller diameter (8 meters?)...”

Naval Group (NG) not having sea proven AIP (since MESMA days) might not be  disadvantaged compared to AIP specialists Saab and TKMS. This is because the Walrus and Replacements have very long range mission profiles (all the way to the Dutch Caribbean and return). For such long missions carrying AIP (especially the super-cooled liquid oxygen LOX) is a heavy, space-taking, burden, of marginal utility, rather than an asset.

In any case NG's Walrus Replacement may well have longer full submergence Lithium-ion Batteries, probably from French company Saft.

If Naval Group won, this is bad news for Saab, long expected to be the winner. Saab has desperately needed foreign orders since Saab lost Singapore’s Invincible-class tender to TKMS in 2013.